The Art of War
Sun Tzu
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Chapter I. LAYING PLANS
Chapter One introduces Sun Tzu's foundational framework for assessing military conflict before it begins. He identifies five constant factors—the Moral Law, Heaven, Earth, the Commander, and Method and Discipline—as essential considerations, then translates them into seven comparative questions used to forecast which side will win. The chapter also introduces the principle that all warfare is based on deception, urging commanders to conceal strength, feign weakness, and manipulate the enemy's expectations. It closes by emphasizing that victory belongs to those who make many calculations beforehand, while defeat awaits those who calculate little or not at all.
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Chapter II. WAGING WAR
Chapter Two shifts from pre-war calculation to the practical economics of actually fighting. Sun Tzu details the massive daily cost of fielding an army and warns that prolonged campaigns exhaust a state's wealth, dull its soldiers' spirit, and invite opportunistic rivals to strike while it's weakened. He argues that speed, even if imperfect, beats a long, "clever" war, since no nation has ever benefited from protracted conflict. His proposed solution is to minimize dependence on home supply lines by foraging and capturing resources from the enemy, rewarding troops with captured spoils, and absorbing defeated soldiers to strengthen one's own force.
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Chapter III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM
Chapter Three argues that the ideal form of victory captures the enemy's cities, armies, and kingdom intact rather than destroying them, and ranks strategies from best to worst: thwarting the enemy's plans, isolating them from allies, engaging their army directly, and, worst of all, besieging walled cities. Sun Tzu gives numerical rules for when to attack, divide forces, avoid, or flee based on relative troop strength, and warns that rulers can cripple their own armies by issuing uninformed orders, governing the military like civil administration, or promoting officers carelessly. He lists five conditions for victory, including knowing when to fight and having a general free from royal interference. The chapter closes with its most famous principle: knowing both yourself and the enemy guarantees safety in a hundred battles, while ignorance of either or both leads to inconsistent success or certain defeat.
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Chapter IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS
Chapter Four argues that skilled fighters first make themselves invulnerable to defeat, then wait for the enemy to create an opening, since victory over the enemy can't be forced but defeat-proofing yourself can. Sun Tzu distinguishes defense (insufficient strength) from offense (superabundant strength) and praises victories that look effortless and earn no glory, because they were secured through foresight rather than brute combat. He outlines a five-step method—measurement, estimation, calculation, comparison, and victory—showing that battlefield success is the product of prior groundwork, not improvisation. The chapter closes by comparing a truly prepared army's advance to floodwaters bursting into a deep chasm, unstoppable because the advantage was built long before contact.
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Chapter V. ENERGY
Chapter Five explains how commanders manage large, complex forces through subdivision, signals, and the interplay of direct (cheng) and indirect (ch'i) methods, which combine endlessly like musical notes or colors to produce infinite tactical variation. Sun Tzu emphasizes timing and restraint, comparing decisive action to a bent crossbow releasing its trigger or a falcon's precisely timed strike. He argues that convincing deception—feigned disorder, fear, or weakness—actually requires underlying discipline, courage, and strength, illustrated by the story of the Hsiung-nu luring a Han Emperor into ambush. The chapter closes by describing how a well-organized army generates unstoppable collective momentum, likened to a round stone rolling down a steep mountain.
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Chapter VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG
Chapter Six explains how a commander creates decisive numerical superiority at the point of contact even when overall forces are equal. Sun Tzu advises striking undefended places, concealing one's own dispositions, and forcing the enemy to guess and divide his forces, which weakens him everywhere while keeping one's own army unified and concentrated. He shows how to provoke a passive enemy into fighting or bluff an eager enemy out of attacking, and stresses learning the enemy's plans through probing and observation. The chapter closes with the famous water metaphor: like water avoiding high ground for low, successful tactics must be formless, adapting to the enemy and terrain rather than repeating a fixed method.
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Chapter VII. MANŒUVERING
Chapter Seven addresses the difficulty of tactical maneuvering: turning indirect routes into faster paths and misfortune into advantage, illustrated by generals who feign delay before executing rapid, decisive marches. Sun Tzu warns that forced marches over long distances fracture an army and cause devastating losses, making supply lines, terrain knowledge, and local guides essential prerequisites for movement. He then details the mechanics of unified command—gongs, drums, banners, and flags—that let a general control massive forces as a single body, and explains how to exploit the enemy's psychological rhythms, such as declining morale over the course of a day. The chapter closes with a set of tactical maxims urging restraint: avoid uphill attacks, feigned retreats, obvious bait, blocking a homeward-bound enemy, and cornering a desperate foe too tightly.
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Chapter VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS
Chapter Eight argues that mastering warfare requires knowing when to deviate from standard tactical rules, since certain roads, armies, towns, positions, and even a sovereign's commands must sometimes be disregarded despite conventional wisdom. Sun Tzu insists that a wise general always blends considerations of advantage and disadvantage, using this mixed calculation both to temper success and to find a way out of difficulty. He then lists five dangerous character flaws in a commander—recklessness, cowardice, a quick temper, oversensitivity to shame, and excessive concern for his troops' comfort—each of which an enemy can exploit and which historically has led to a general's downfall. The chapter closes by stating that when an army is destroyed and its leader killed, the cause can always be traced to one of these five faults.
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Chapter IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH
Chapter Nine covers how to position and move an army across four terrain types—mountains, rivers, marshes, and flat country—emphasizing access to water, high dry ground, and defensible positioning, illustrated by Han Hsin's dam trick at the Wei River. Sun Tzu then details an extensive system for reading enemy intentions and conditions from environmental and behavioral signs: dust patterns reveal troop types, bird and animal behavior reveal ambushes, and small human details like soldiers leaning on spears or water-carriers drinking first reveal starvation, thirst, or low morale. He also shows how apparent diplomatic gestures or aggressive posturing can be deceptive, illustrated by T'ien Tan's psychological manipulation and fire-ox attack at Chi-mo. The chapter closes by arguing that troops must be won over with humanity before discipline is imposed, since trust established first makes strict enforcement effective rather than resented.
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Chapter X. TERRAIN
Chapter Ten identifies six types of terrain—accessible, entangling, temporising, narrow passes, precipitous heights, and distant ground—each demanding different tactical responses, mostly centered on securing high ground first and controlling supply lines. It then describes six calamities (flight, insubordination, collapse, ruin, disorganization, rout) that arise not from terrain but from a general's own failures in leadership, discipline, or judgment. Sun Tzu argues that a general's battlefield judgment should override even a ruler's orders when victory or defeat is at stake, and that troops must be treated with genuine care to remain loyal, though without becoming spoiled through indulgence. The chapter closes by expanding the earlier "know yourself, know the enemy" principle to include knowledge of heaven and earth as the key to complete victory.
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Chapter XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS
Chapter Eleven catalogs nine types of terrain—dispersive, facile, contentious, open, intersecting highways, serious, difficult, hemmed-in, and desperate ground—each demanding a distinct tactical response, from avoiding battle on home soil to fighting without hesitation when escape is impossible. Sun Tzu argues that deep penetration into enemy territory increases army cohesion, and illustrates unbreakable unity with the image of the shuai-jan snake and the example of rival states cooperating when trapped together in a storm. He insists a general must mystify even his own troops, concealing plans and cutting off retreat options (burning boats, breaking cooking-pots) to force total commitment, banning superstition and hesitation alike. The chapter closes with practical opening moves for a new commander—sealing borders, silencing messengers—and the famous image of acting first with the coyness of a maiden, then the sudden speed of a hare once opportunity appears.
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Chapter XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE
Chapter Twelve details five methods of attacking with fire—burning soldiers, supplies, baggage trains, arsenals, or hurling flaming projectiles—and specifies the dry conditions and lunar timing needed for wind to carry the flames effectively. Sun Tzu outlines five scenarios a commander must recognize once fire breaks out, emphasizing that attacking from the windward side and reading the enemy's reaction (panic versus calm) determines whether to press the assault. He briefly contrasts fire's destructive power with water's more limited ability to merely obstruct an enemy. The chapter closes by pivoting from technical fire tactics to a broader warning against waging war or fighting out of anger or wounded pride, since destroyed kingdoms and dead soldiers, unlike moods, can never be restored.
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Chapter XIII. THE USE OF SPIES
Chapter Thirteen argues that the enormous cost of war makes intelligence-gathering a moral and practical necessity, since foreknowledge of the enemy cannot come from superstition, past analogy, or calculation—only from other people. Sun Tzu defines five types of spies (local, inward, converted, doomed, and surviving) and explains how they interlock, with the converted spy—an enemy agent turned to one's own side—serving as the essential hub that makes all the others effective. He insists spies must be treated with unmatched intimacy, generosity, and secrecy, while also being willing to sacrifice "doomed spies" by feeding them false information to deceive the enemy. The chapter closes by declaring that an army without spies is like a person without eyes or ears, positioning intelligence as the foundation underlying every other principle in the book.